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SPEECH
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: IS IT
IMPAIRED OR BOLSTERED BY JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY?
CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK & BRADLEY T. KINGt
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon. It is so wonderful to be here among friends,
colleagues, students, faculty, and alumni. What a delightful day
it has been! I met with all the iLs and their professors. I visited
the clinics and was so very inspired by the quality of their work
and their professionalism. I also met with the Ron Brown Prep
students and the LALSA students and was again inspired by this
wonderful next generation of leaders in our communities and in
the profession. Lunch with the faculty was fun, informative, and
stimulating. It always helps us in the courts to be aware of the
concerns of the Academy, and I thank you, Dean Simons, for the
opportunity to speak with the faculty.
And, how wonderful it is for all of us and the Law School
that our Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman is here and Associate
Judges Victoria Graffeo and Susan Read. Welcome to St. John's.
What a great honor it is for me to stand before you today as
the fourth Honorable Joseph W. Bellacosa Distinguished Jurist-
in-Residence. I will do my very best this evening to contribute in
a meaningful fashion to an important and sometimes
misunderstood subject: that of judicial independence and judicial
accountability.
My discussions with the law school earlier this year were
memorialized in two letters, the first from the Honorable Joseph
W. Bellacosa, my good friend and truly distinguished jurist-
teacher-dean, who wrote: "You will be the first alum (alumna) to
honor Alma Mater and to honor me." The truth is, Judge
I Bradley T. King is a former Law Clerk to Court of Appeals Judge Carmen
Beauchamp Ciparick.
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Bellacosa and Alma Mater, it is you who honor me. The second
letter was from then Acting Dean Andrew Simons, who wrote: "I
look forward to the next wonderful installment of this enriching
program."
Well, Andy, tonight I will continue the conversation and the
discussion begun so eloquently by my sister and ever-
phenomenal former Chief Judge of the State of New York, the
Honorable Judith S. Kaye. She spoke about new court initiatives
and innovations resulting in the creation of problem-solving
courts and laid before us a formula for saving lives and
improving public safety while delivering justice.' The following
year, we heard from the Honorable Frank Williams, Chief Justice
of Rhode Island, who, like Judge Kaye before him, did a full day
with students and faculty culminating in a colloquium
interspersing his judicial commentary with his Lincoln expertise
involving the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the
Civil War and its application to contemporary executive/judicial
branch tensions. And then, of course, earlier this year, we were
graced with a visit from former American Bar Association
President and Michigan Supreme Court Justice Dennis Archer,
who addressed the role of the bar in helping to protect the
independent functioning of the judicial branch.
Tonight, we will continue the tradition of this stellar
program that celebrates our former Dean Bellacosa's many
contributions to the law school, the judiciary, and the legal
profession. As a result of some brainstorming with Judge
Bellacosa and others, I have chosen to continue the discussion of
judicial independence and its corollary judicial accountability,
and I particularly want to focus on how it is enhanced by an
effective system of judicial discipline which we in New York are
so very fortunate to enjoy.
First, however, a disclaimer on my part. Before being named
to the Court of Appeals in 1993, I served at the behest of the
Honorable Governor Mario Cuomo as a member of the New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct. I served from 1985 to
1993 as a judicial member, of whom there were four of eleven
members, mostly lawyers, appointed by the Governor, the Chief
Judge and the leaders of the State Senate and Assembly. During
1 See Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Inaugural Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa Distinguished
Jurist-in-Residence: Lecture, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 743 (2007).
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those eight years as a Commission member, I was privy to every
complaint filed with the Commission. I signed off on the many
hundreds that were dismissed as being meritless on their face,
sought to investigate others, voted charges on some, assigned
referees to hear and report, heard arguments on motions to
affirm and disaffirm such referees' findings, and ultimately made
determinations on questions of misconduct and penalty to be
imposed. I witnessed first-hand the complexity of the issues
presented and how much attention was paid to the need to
balance judicial discipline with judicial independence. During
those years, there was always a robust discussion as to whether
an obvious and substantial judicial error or series of errors
should be investigated. One interesting aspect of that discussion
was the Commission's authority under a rule it promulgated to
dismiss and caution a judge for violations of the ethics standards
that did not warrant formal proceedings.2 It was felt that if the
Commission overlooked an error (and dismissed the complaint),
would it be doing a disservice to the judge by not privately
cautioning the judge to be aware of the error? Before cautioning
a judge, however, the Commission first had to investigate and
obtain a response from the judge. A dismissal and caution thus
became an informal nonpublic disciplinary sanction which could
be used in future cases under certain circumstances. A judge
who received such a caution about a single error might avoid a
more serious disciplinary proceeding in the future (that would be
based on a series of such errors) if the judge heeded the advice.
Upon my elevation to the Court of Appeals, I had to
relinquish my position on the Commission, as Commission
determinations are reviewed in the Court of Appeals. For the
first year or so on the court, I recused from such reviews as I had
participated in the matters below but eventually I joined the six
members of my court in passing on judicial misconduct
determinations. Since I have been at the Court of Appeals, close
to sixteen years now, the court has heard challenges to thirty-
nine Commission determinations, accepting Commission
determinations and the precise disciplinary sanctions determined
by the Commission in thirty-six of those cases. And in the other
three cases, determinations were modified from removal to
censure or admonition.
2 See N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 22, ch. V, § 7000.1(l) (2010).
20101
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
I would like to begin with the proposition that:
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ARE
NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
Throughout the years, there have been differing opinions
expressed about what makes a judge fully independent. My view
is that an independent judge is one who is accountable to the rule
of law, and specifically to those fundamental precepts of due
process that exist to ensure impartial decisionmaking and justice
for all who come before the judge. In my thirty-one years as a
judge, I have found that the great majority of our judges perform
their duties well, are dedicated and diligent, and most
professional. Most understand the need for accountability to the
public, the bar, the litigants, their colleagues, and the greater
community. All are subject to rules governing judicial conduct
and most function effectively within the rules.
There are those few, however, who have been the subject of
judicial discipline, some for acts of abuse of power and corruption
of the judicial office. No reasonable person would quarrel with
the view that they deserved removal from the bench. But
disciplining judges for judicial error has created a stir in judicial
circles. It is this stir which I will address.
When judges are disciplined, as they have been, for
fundamental legal errors, we experience the intersection of
judicial independence in decisionmaking and judicial
accountability. A new jurisprudence is developing in this area,
the contours of which are being defined by the New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct and our State Court of Appeals.
Many scholars have engaged in the project of mapping
judicial motivations and determining how and to what extent
non-legal factors, such as ideology and background, influence,
overtly or implicitly, the relative independence of judicial
decisionmaking.3 Such an interdisciplinary sojourn is beyond the
scope of this lecture, but I shall endeavor to engage you in
another sort of analysis. Drawing upon my many years of
experience as a trial judge, Judge of the Court of Appeals, and
3 For an excellent summary of "attitudinal" studies and others that attempt to
describe the factors, both legal and non-legal, that may influence judicial
decisionmaking, see Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial
Independence, in Judicial Independence at the Crossroads 22-27 (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
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member of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
I hope to demonstrate how the concepts of judicial accountability
and judicial independence are interrelated and self-reinforcing.
Like my former colleagues, Chief Judge Kaye and Judge
Bellacosa, who have tackled the topic in the past,4 I recognize
that the term "judicial independence" is a somewhat amorphous
concept and is thus easily misunderstood. Certainly, no one
would seriously argue that judges' decisionmaking is-or ever
could be-entirely independent. To the contrary, judges are
constrained by precedent, constitutional and statutory language,
and other institutional norms, such as the need to fully articulate
one's decisions in coherent and logical opinions. This is as it
should be, for our system exists to ensure that we issue decisions
that, above all, demonstrate impartiality and fidelity to the rule
of law.
It is fitting to have this discussion on this first Monday in
October as Justice Sonia Sotomayor joins her colleagues on the
United States Supreme Court bench. As you all witnessed this
summer, comments that then-Judge Sotomayor had made in
extra-judicial speeches, along with her participation in an
appellate decision that she understood to be governed by case
law, provided much fodder for some members of the United
States Senate Judiciary Committee in questioning her capacity
for impartiality and decisional independence. Many rejected
these attacks as unfounded and, ultimately, the attacks were
unsuccessful. Regardless, they raised questions amongst the
bench, bar, and public regarding what it means to engage in
truly independent decisionmaking.
The concept of judicial accountability, too, is capable of
engendering some misunderstanding. Chief Judge Jonathan
Lippman, upon receiving the United State Supreme Court's
William H. Rehnquist Memorial Award for Judicial Excellence
last year, remarked that in addition to decisional independence
of individual judges, the courts' institutional independence must
also be respected-"the right of the courts as a co-equal branch of
4 See generally Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial
Independence and Lawyer Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703 (1997); Hon.
Joseph W. Bellacosa, Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2381 (1997).
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government to govern ourselves .... "' In that regard, he noted,
interest groups have "distorted" the concept of accountability to
suggest to the public that judicial decisions are no different than
those issued by the political branches of government.6 This is an
unfortunate development since it threatens the public's
confidence in the judiciary's ability to fulfill its core
constitutional function as protector of the rule of law.
Our own Professor John Q. Barrett has likewise commented
that there are at least two salient aspects of an independent
judiciary: the first is institutional and the second decisional
autonomy.7 My focus today will be on decisional autonomy and
the role of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
a constitutionally-created body that, in my opinion, has improved
judicial accountability through enforcement of the Rules
Governing Judicial Conduct. 8
These rules are contained as part of the Rules of the Chief
Administrator of the Courts. They were adopted after
consultation with the Administrative Board of the Courts,
comprised of the four Presiding Justices of the Appellate
Divisions and the Chief Judge, and were approved by the Court
of Appeals. The rules provide guidance and notice to judges of
basic ethical standards which govern a judge's conduct both on
and off the bench. As stated in the Preamble to the Rules, they
are to be construed so as not to impinge on the essential
independence of judges in making judicial decisions.'
The baseline standards set by the rules promulgated by the
Unified Court System and enforced by the Commission greatly
facilitate the exercise of a jurist's decisional independence. When
the public is secure in the knowledge that judges are subject to
inquiry on a meritorious complaint of misconduct, it is much
more willing to accept judicial decisionmaking, a result that
' Jonathan Lippman, Institutional Independence of the Judiciary, 240 N.Y. L.J.
6 (2008).
6 See id.
' See John Q. Barrett, Introduction: The Voices and Groups that Will Preserve
(What We Can Preserve of) Judicial Independence, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 1, 4 (1996); see also Hon. Patience Drake Roggensack, To Begin a
Conversation on Judicial Independence, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 535, 537 (2007) ("[Mlost
agree that as a general concept, judicial independence has two components:
institutional independence and decisional independence.").
I See generally N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22; N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 40-48 (McKinney
2010); N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 22, ch. I, §§ 100.1-.6 (2010).
' See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 22, ch. I, §§ 100.1-.6.
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redounds to the benefit of both society and its judiciary. 10 Thus,
as Judge Kaye has said, writing in the Hofstra Law Review,
"People respect the law and are willing to live by the law, only as
long as they believe that it operates fairly and effectively.""
Public confidence is a necessary, but not exclusive condition
for decisional independence. To be truly independent, a judge
must ground his or her decisions in the rule of law, striving
always to, as Judge Bellacosa so cogently put it, "moor their oath-
bound work steadfastly to lasting principles" and thereby "serve
society and the litigants before them with intellectual and
personal integrity and stubborn neutrality." 2 Because a judge
"ha[s] no constituents, save The Law itself," real decisional
independence occurs when a judge is willing to follow The Law
where it leads, regardless of his or her personal preferences. 3
Some discussions of judicial independence have fostered the
impression that judicial accountability and independence are
diametrically opposed one to another. 4 Calls for holding "activist
judges" accountable to the popular will frequently recur when
10 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm
of Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 916 (2006) ("A system of judicial
accountability that reassures a sometimes-skeptical public that judges are doing
their jobs properly and yet respects the judiciary's independence can forestall resort
to more draconian and counter-productive forms of court control."); Frances Kahn
Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 625, 635 (1999) ("A legitimate mechanism of judicial discipline actually
enhances judicial independence because it contributes to the public's willingness to
grant authority to the courts.").
11 Kaye, supra note 4, at 710.
12 Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 2385, 2401.
13 See id. at 2401; Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United
States, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 989, 989 (1996) ("The question of judicial independence
revolves around the theme of how to assure that judges decide according to law,
rather than according to their own whims or to the will of the political branches of
government."); Hon. Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 671, 688 (1980) ("The essence of judicial independence . . .is the
preservation of a separate institution of government that can adjudicate cases or
controversies with impartiality."); Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial
Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 61 (1998).
14 See AM. BAR ASS'N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, 12 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf (noting that "Uludicial
independence, then, must be tempered by judicial accountability" and that "the
phrase 'judicial accountability. .... can be employed in the service of those who
would... obliterate judicial independence and the rule of law altogether by
intimidating judges into contorting the law to reach results popular with temporary
majorities of the public").
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one side or another is unsuccessful in a hotly contested litigation.
The implication is that judicial decisionmaking that has not
resulted in a particular preferred outcome should be amenable to
some sort of discipline. That of course would give judicial
disciplinary bodies dangerous power and would impair the
independence of the judiciary. An even greater risk to judicial
independence would be the use of alternatives to the Commission
system by a Governor who might be inclined to invoke the
antiquated legislative removal of a judge for an unpopular
decision.
Indeed, the Founders envisioned judicial independence as a
means of ensuring accountability not to the partisan clamor of
the day, but to lasting legal principles that were to be neutrally
applied to all members of the community.'"
Accordingly, it is important not to speak about judicial
independence and accountability in purely functional terms. For
the nature of judging presupposes that one side or another will
be disappointed by the outcome of any given case-at best, judges
can only have a fifty percent approval rating. Instead, we must
view both concepts as means to serve the same end-ensuring
equal justice under the law to all." When a judge exhibits the
stubborn impartiality and neutrality that Judge Bellacosa has
spoken of, the judge has acted in a manner that is fully
independent and accountable.' 7  When personal interests,
partisan affiliations, or fear of public reprisal cloud the decisional
process, however, the judge has failed on both counts.'
This is not to say, however, that there may not be an
inherent tension between the enforcement of judicial conduct
rules and independent decisionmaking. 9 Any system of judicial
15 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Three Independences, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 603,
612 (2004) ("Judges who fail to maintain and respect the difference between judicial
and extrajudicial reasoning are not independent in the American constitutional
sense, no matter how secure their positions and how respected their judgments, for
those judgments will necessarily be subservient to something other than the people's
law.").
16 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of Judicial Independence, 80
JUDICATURE 117, 117 (1996).
17 See Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 2401.
18 See Geyh, supra note 10, at 916 ("[Plroperly employed, accountability merely
diminishes a judge's freedom to make herself dependent on inappropriate internal or
external influences that could interfere with her capacity to follow the rule of law.").
'9 See Lubet, supra note 13, at 65 ("There are situations in which the
possibility of discipline most definitely does endanger the independence of the
[Vol. 84:1
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discipline carries with it the potential to constrain judges from
deciding cases in an absolutely independent manner.2 ° We expect
judges to comport themselves in a manner consistent with the
solemn responsibility they have to mete out equal justice in cases
potentially implicating the rights not just of the parties before
them, but-because of the precedential effects of judicial
rulings-of those throughout the state and the nation.21 New
York, like every other state-has established a method of
enforcing a mode of judicial discipline that fosters public
confidence in its courts.22 In my view, that effort has largely
succeeded in balancing the rights of judges to decide
independently within the bounds of the law while remaining
accountable to standards of conduct that are consistent with the
due process that the dispensing of equal justice requires.
THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Turning now to a specific discussion of our New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, a short history is in order. In
1977, the electorate overwhelmingly voted to establish the New
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.23 By that action,
the people created a body that would, according to Article VI, §
22(a) of our constitution, "receive, initiate, investigate and hear
complaints with respect to the conduct, qualifications, fitness to
perform or performance ... of any judge or justice of the unified
court system."24 At the time, it was clear that the traditional
methods for enforcing judicial discipline-impeachment 25 and
legislative removal26-were cumbersome processes, subject to
judiciary. The most serious threat arises when sanctions are based on the content of
a judge's decisions.").
20 See Geyh, supra note 10, at 916; see also JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT
AND ETHICS § 1.04, 1-10 (4th ed. 2007) (hereinafter "Alfini") ("Because judicial
independence is an integral part of our legal system, the argument that it is
threatened by a system ofjudicial discipline cannot be lightly dismissed.").
21 See Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent
and Accountable Judges, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 58 (2000).
22 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. REV. 315, 345, 347 (1999) (quoting 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH 273 (3d ed. 1908)). For background on the variety of judicial
conduct organizations ("JCOs") established in the fifty states and District of
Columbia, see Alfini, supra note 20, at § 13.02.
23 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22.
24 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22(a).
25 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 24.
26 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 23.
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partisan influence, and largely ineffective because they permitted
only one draconian sanction-removal." An earlier method, trial
before the New York Court on the Judiciary, had failed to
measure up because-being composed entirely of judges-that
court was subject to the criticism that its membership would be
overly solicitous to the needs of accused jurists and because it
was convened only after certain scandals had erupted and lacked
any centralized staff.2"
In contrast, the Commission's structure is designed to
streamline the disciplinary process, professionalize the
disciplinary system, and add an investigative capacity that
earlier disciplinary forums lacked. The Commission's eleven
members, appointed by representatives of each branch of
government, represent different segments of the community.29
The four gubernatorial appointees include one attorney, two non-
lawyers, and one judge. The Chief Judge selects one Appellate
Division Justice and two judges from courts other than the Court
of Appeals or Appellate Divisions. And each legislative leader
selects a person other than a judge or retired judge. The
Commission members serve staggered four-year terms, which
maintains continuity in the membership.
Also, the statutory authority to employ an adequate number
of staff allows the Commission to develop state-wide uniformity
in the enforcement of the ethics standards and an institutional
expertise in the area of judicial discipline. 0
The composition of the Commission is "expressly designed to
be non-partisan and independent."3 1 Given the broad subpoena
power and investigative capabilities that the Commission has at
its disposal, such independence is essential.2 It does not appear,
27 See ALFINI, supra note 20 at § 1.04, at 1-9; see also The Task Force on
Judicial Selection & Court Merger, Judicial Accountability and Judicial
Independence: The Judge Lorin Duckman Case Should Not Be Referred to the State
Senate, 51 THE RECORD 629, 631 (1996) ("The legislative removal process [in New
York] proved far too cumbersome, expensive and time-consuming to be an effective
means of overseeing the judiciary.").
2 See The Task Force on Judicial Selection & Court Merger, supra note 27, at
646-47.
2 See id. at 632, 648.
30 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 41(7) (McKinney 2010).
3' See The Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Conduct, Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Judicial Conduct, 54 THE RECORD 598, 602 (1998).
32 See N.Y. State Comm. on Judicial Conduct v. Doe, 61 N.Y.2d 56, 60, 459 N.E.
850, 852, 471 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (1984) ("Quite simply, so long as the commission, in
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except in the rare instance, that the Commission has attempted
to enforce so-called "decisional accountability"33 by intruding on
the discretion of individual judges. Nor would it be proper for the
Commission to do so since New York's Rules Governing Judicial
Conduct begin with the premise that "[a]n independent and
honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society."34
The Commission has been primarily concerned with
enforcing standards of "behavioral accountability," or the ways
and means in which judges comport themselves regardless of the
relative merits or demerits of the decisions they ultimately reach
in a given case. 5  Those merits or demerits are reviewable
through the traditional appellate process. While critics argue
that the Commission has interfered with the exercise of judicial
discretion, the Commission's authority is limited to disciplining
judges for flagrant errors that by their nature violate one or more
of the ethics rules applicable to judges.
Although in its first two decades the Commission faced
criticism among judges for disciplining certain court rulings and
procedures, at this point it is recognized that the Commission has
authority to discipline (subject to review in the Court of Appeals)
certain actions of judges, including the failure to advise a
defendant of the right to counsel, the failure even to make an
attempt to ascertain whether a defendant qualifies for assigned
counsel, the failure to consider statutory factors in the Criminal
Procedure Law for purposes of setting bail, the setting of
outrageously high bail for the purpose of coercing guilty pleas,
and other abuses of bail. There is no dispute any longer whether
judges who engage in such improper conduct may be disciplined
because the Court of Appeals has upheld Commission
determinations that held individual judges accountable.
The early controversy derived primarily from the relative
novelty of subjecting any judge to discipline for violating the
fundamental rights of litigants. Indeed, prior to the
establishment of the Commission it was rare that any judges
were subject to any sort of discipline whether based on their
good faith, is investigating the conduct of a Judge, the commission is acting within
the scope of its authority and a subpoena issued pursuant thereto is not subject to
challenge.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
- See ALFINI, supra note 20, at § 1.04, 1-11.
3 See N.Y.C.R.R., tit. 22,, ch. I, § 100.1 (2010).
3 See ALFINI, supra note 20, at § 1.04, 1-11.
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decisional conduct or otherwise. Only twenty-three judges were
disciplined by "the patchwork system of ad hoc judicial
disciplinary bodies" 36 in the one-hundred years prior to the
Commission's creation. In contrast, in approximately thirty-
three years, since the creation of the Commission, 751 judges
have been publicly disciplined and 157 removed from office.37
One commentator has noted that the lack of discipline in general
during those early years, for egregious legal errors in particular,
was most likely due to a lack of a systematic means of
investigating judicial impropriety and to the fact that the only
authorized sanction for any misconduct was, as I indicated
earlier, removal." The concept, however, of disciplining a judge
for certain decisions is not new. As early as 1895, New York
courts recognized that a judge's decisions could be a basis for
discipline if they were based on an intentional violation or
disregard of the laws. However, the possibility of predicating a
judicial misconduct case on an erroneous legal ruling-or series
thereof-was essentially non-existent.39
All that changed with the Commission system. Now a non-
partisan body can authorize a dedicated staff to investigate
complaints that allege conduct that violates the court system's
rules governing judicial conduct.4 ° If the Commission determines
that charges need to be brought, a hearing is conducted, presided
over by a referee to hear and report with recommendations. The
full commission, including its four judge members who could be
expected to have a deep-seated commitment to the value of
judicial independence, presides over a formal argument, the
results of which (and the full record) are ultimately reviewable at
the judge's option to the highest state court, the New York State
Court of Appeals, which is vested in ensuring the maintenance of
an independent judiciary.41 Thus, judicial independence was
36 See N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 34
(2009).
37 See id. at 41.
See Gerald Stern, Is Judicial Discipline in New York State a Threat to
Judicial Independence?, 7 PACE L. REv. 291, 304 (1987); see also In re Droege, 129
A.D. 866, 882, 114 N.Y.S. 375, 386-87 (1st Dep't 1909) (holding that removal for
legal error is appropriate if conduct was based on "unworthy or illegal motives" or
evidenced "ignorance... a perverted character, or... a lack of judicial qualities").
19 See Stern, supra note 38.
40 See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 44 (1)-(2) (McKinney 2010).
"' See id. at § 44(4), (7).
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built into the Commission system.42 Not surprisingly, the body of
law that has developed in the past thirty years on the subject of
judicial discipline based on legal error has managed to effectively
balance our state's commitment to impartial and independent
judicial decisionmaking with accountability to one-and only
one-constituent, the rule of law.
When judges decide according to the rule of law, they are
behaving in both an independent and accountable manner.
Judges in our system are only granted independence so that they
can serve the public by deciding cases fairly, impartially, and in
accordance with the law.
Turning now to:
THE COURT'S ROLE IN DECIDING THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY
Defining just what class of errors should be subject to
discipline is a delicate process that must pay careful heed to both
the legal and factual context in any given case lest judges be
disciplined for exercising their lawful discretion in novel or
unpopular ways or for just making mistakes.43  Certainly,
discipline based on a mere judgment call while exercising
permissible judicial discretion would be beyond the Commission's
reach. The challenge to traditional notions of judicial
independence inherent in imposing discipline based on a jurist's
exercise of his or her most fundamental duty-the duty to
decide-has led at least one law review commentator to describe
as "earthshaking" the disciplining of judges who violate litigants'
fundamental rights." Earthshaking perhaps in the 1970s, but
42 Commentators have concluded that the inclusion of judicial members on JCOs
is one of several effective means of safeguarding judicial independence. See ALFINI,
supra note 20, at § 1.04, 1-11 ("[The system operates essentially through self-
regulation. In every state system, judges are included in the composition of judicial
conduct commissions .... ); Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and
Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1248-49 (2004) ("The extensive involvement of other judges
on the conduct commissions and in the review of judicial discipline cases ensures
that the perspective of the judiciary and deference to its independence is reflected in
the decision whether to find misconduct based on legal error.").
' See Gray, supra note 42, at 1246-47 ("It is not unethical to be imperfect, and
it would be unfair to sanction a judge for not being infallible while making hundreds
of decisions under often pressure.").
4 See Keith Swisher, The Modern Movement of Vindicating Violations of
Criminal Defendants' Rights Through Judicial Discipline, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 255, 256 (2008).
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few would dispute that that is precisely what the Commission
has the authority to do today; and we, the Court of Appeals, have
given it the authority since it is the court that renders public
discipline in New York-unless the judge who is subject to
discipline chooses not to seek review in the Court of Appeals,
then the Commission's determination stands.
Unlike other high courts that review every decision of
judicial conduct commissions, we are limited to hearing only
those matters initiated by the judges themselves.45
If a judge does not exercise his or her right to review in the
Court of Appeals, we have no jurisdiction to review the
Commission determinations. Thus, our legal-error precedents
deal with severe judicial misconduct and not more-debatable
legal errors. Our court is somewhat hamstrung in developing
precedents defining the type of judicial error that constitutes
misconduct. Most judges facing either public admonition or
censure do not choose to seek review of the Commission
determinations in the Court of Appeals. Perhaps one reason is
the expense of seeking review; another may be that they choose
"to leave well enough alone" and not risk a greater disciplinary
sanction. As to the expense, it is the judge's burden to provide a
record of the proceedings before the Commission. Perhaps that
expense could be shifted to the Commission or to the court
system to alleviate the financial burden on the judge. If more
Commission determinations were reviewed, the court would have
an even greater opportunity to establish standards for
disciplining judges for serious judicial errors.
Nonetheless, certain broad principles have been articulated
by the Court of Appeals that, in my view, balance effectively
judicial independence and accountability.
THE RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL CONDUCT
As I stated earlier, New York's guide in the area of judicial
ethics has been the Chief Administrator's Rules Governing
Judicial Conduct. These tell us that "an independent and
honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.""
They explain how to be both independent and honorable, or as I
maintain, both independent and accountable. To do so, a judge
45 See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 44(7) (McKinney 2010).
46 See N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 22, ch. I, § 100.1 (2010).
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"shall," among other things, "respect and comply with the law,"47
"be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in
it, " 48 "perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice against or
in favor of any person,"49 and "accord to every person who has a
legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right
to be heard according to law."5" These standards envisage a
jurist as the guardian of the public's legal rights and presume
that judges will remain tethered to legal principles when
exercising decisional independence. The rules also reflect the
close connection between judicial independence and
accountability.
THE COURT APPLIED THE RULES TO FLAGRANT PROCEDURAL
ABUSES
As established by a trilogy of Court of Appeals cases twenty-
five years ago, In re Sardino, In re McGee, and In re Reeves, "a
repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their
constitutional and statutory rights.. . is serious misconduct,"
warranting removal.5 When judges engage in such patently
inappropriate behavior, they leave those they serve-the
litigants who seek justice in our courts-with the incorrect
impression that the legal system is unfair and unjust.52 It isn't.
Rather, a jurist's refusal to act in accordance with well-settled
fundamental rights is patently unfair.
In this connection, particularly troubling is the failure of
certain judges to advise litigants in criminal and family court
proceedings of their right to counsel, a right which serves to
facilitate the judicial process, not inhibit it. 5 Indeed, "[tihe right
to counsel, in practical respects, remains absolutely fundamental
4 See id. § 100.2 (A).
4 See id. § 100.3 (B)(1).
4 See id. § 100.3 (B)(4).
o See id. § 100.3 (B)(6).
' See In re Reeves, 63 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 469 N.E.2d 1321, 1323, 480 N.Y.S.2d
463, 465 (1984) (citing In re Sardino, 58 N.Y.2d 286, 448 N.E.2d 83, 461 N.Y.S.2d
229 (1983) and In re McGee, 59 N.Y.2d 870, 452 N.E.2d 1258, 465 N.Y.S.2d 930
(1983)).
52 See In re Jung, 11 N.Y.3d 365, 374, 899 N.E.2d 925, 932, 870 N.Y.S.2d 819,
826 (2008) (quoting In re Esworthy, 77 N.Y.2d 280, 283, 568 N.E.2d 1195, 1196, 567
N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (1991)).
5 See, e.g., id. at 375, 899 N.E.2d at 932, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 826; In re Bauer, 3
N.Y.3d 158, 160, 818 N.E.2d 1113, 1115, 785 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (2004).
20101
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to the protection of a defendant's other substantive rights."54
When judges are unwilling to facilitate a litigant's access to
counsel, who can assist the court in assessing the unique factual
circumstances present for their review in each particular case,
they manifest an unwillingness to remain accountable to the law
and thus their capacity for truly independent decisionmaking is
open to serious doubt.5
One of these three cases concerned a family court judge who
had ignored procedures established to assure fair proceedings in
family court. The Commission had designated a prominent
former Appellate Division Justice as referee to preside at the
hearing, take evidence, and report to the Commission. The
referee recommended that the charges be dismissed because the
judge had made good-faith mistakes or misapprehended the legal
issues. Among the judge's errors was the failure to advise parties
of their rights, including the right to counsel and to a hearing.
The Commission set aside the conclusions of its own referee and
the court agreed with the Commission.
The court stated, "[a]lthough these were errors of law, they
cannot be excused on that basis. The errors were fundamental
and the pattern of repeating them, coupled with an unwillingness
to recognize their impropriety, indicate that petitioner poses a
threat to the proper administration of justice." 6
In 2005, the court considered a request for review of a
Commission determination that the Kings County Surrogate be
removed for failing to apply statutory requirements in the award
of legal fees to counsel to the Public Administrator, a friend of the
Surrogate. The key statutory provision overlooked by the
Surrogate required counsel to submit an affidavit of legal
services prior to the court's approval of fees. In upholding the
findings and conclusions of the Commission, the court held that
the Surrogate was obligated to familiarize himself with the
governing statute, and in failing to do so, the Surrogate
' In re Bauer, 3 N.Y.3d at 164, 818 N.E.2d at 1118, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
5 Cf id. at 162-63, 818 N.E.2d at 1116-17, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 375-76 (describing
petitioner's practice of setting punitively high bail while withholding vital
information about the right to counsel in an effort to "defeat" defendants' exercise of
that right); In re McGee, 59 N.Y.2d 870, 871, 452 N.E.2d 1258, 1258, 465 N.Y.S.2d
930, 930 (1983) (noting petitioner's practice of failing to advise defendants of their
right to counsel and that "[o]ccasionally, he would actually discourage those
individuals from seeking legal advice").
1 In re Reeves, 63 N.Y.2d at 110-11, 469 N.E.2d at 1323, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
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demonstrated a "shocking disregard for the very law that imbued
him with judicial authority."57 Although favoritism for a friend
permeated the record, the Surrogate argued that his statutory
failures constituted mere legal error and not misconduct. The
court observed that "the two are not necessarily mutually
exclusive... [and] a judge's systematic failure to conform to legal
requirements may form the basis for removal.""8 The court cited
a 2004 decision in a case that resulted in a city court judge's
removal for a pattern of procedural abuses that deprived indigent
defendants of counsel and coerced guilty pleas.
As we learned just last year, in In re Restaino, an otherwise
distinguished judge can prove himself unfit during one
intemperate court session in which he disregards the Criminal
Procedure Law's requirements regarding the setting and
revocation of bail and deprives forty-six defendants of their
liberty simply to redress a minor breach of courtroom decorum, a
ringing cell phone-an unfortunate occurrence, to be sure.59
As to the severity of disciplinary sanctions, which often is the
key issue before the Court of Appeals, the court is concerned with
both the "nature and gravity of the proven wrongdoing."" Our
court has consistently refused to fashion a "numerical yardstick"
by which to measure how much legal error is too much.' This is
as it should be, for the purpose of imposing judicial discipline is
not to punish based on some fixed and unyielding definition of
poor judging, but, as the court said, "[for] the imposition of
sanctions where necessary to safeguard the Bench from unfit
incumbents. "62
Judges prove themselves unfit for service when they act with
"callous disregard" for those constitutional and statutory
provisions that protect an individual's right to be free from
unwarranted governmental restraint, to the establishment and
51 In re Feinberg, 5 N.Y.3d 206, 214, 833 N.E.2d 1204, 1208, 800 N.Y.S.2d 529,
534 (2005).
8 Id. at 215, 833 N.E.2d at 1209, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 534 (citing In re Bauer, 3
N.Y.3d 158, 818 N.E.2d 1113, 785 N.Y.S.2d 372.
51 See In re Restaino, 10 N.Y.3d 577, 590-91, 890 N.E.2d 224, 231-32, 860
N.Y.S.2d 462, 469-70 (2008).
1 Id. at 590, 890 N.E.2d at 232, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 470 (citing Aldrich v. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 58 N.Y.2d 279, 283, 447 N.E.2d 1276, 1278, 460
N.Y.S.2d 915, 917 (1983)).
"' See id.
62 Id. at 589, 890 N.E.2d at 231, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
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maintenance of a parent-child relationship, to be presumed
innocent, and to be accorded a fair trial.63 It is no surprise that
several of the court's legal-error precedents arise in the criminal
and family law contexts, where many litigants are unaware of
the full extent of their rights. The severe consequences and
social stigma attending adverse results in such proceedings
demand that judges adhere strictly to procedural protections at
all times, no matter how trying the circumstances.64 As stated
famously by Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in McNabb
v. United States, "[tihe history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards."65
Judicial independence presupposes that a judge will be able
to render unpopular decisions without fear or favor and that
ability is severely compromised when a judge evidences his or her
willingness to depart from well-settled legal precepts. Such
disregard of clear legal mandates also undermines the public's
right to rely on impartial and neutral decisionmaking, the
bedrock of judicial independence.66
Relatedly, jurists are not empowered to use procedural rules
such as the authority to set bail or to dismiss a criminal
complaint for legal insufficiency to punish either side or to dole
out a measure of rough justice in a particular case.67 The law is
not a guise to be employed to reach results that mesh with one's
personal predilections, uninformed by reasoned decisionmaking.6
' See, e.g., In re Jung, 11 N.Y.3d 365, 899 N.E.2d 925, 870 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2008);
In re Restaino, 10 N.Y.3d 577, 890 N.E.2d 224, 860 N.Y.S.2d 462; In re Bauer, 3
N.Y.3d 158, 818 N.E.2d 1113, 785 N.Y.S.2d 372; In re Esworthy, 77 N.Y.2d 280, 568
N.E.2d 1195, 567 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1991).
Cf. In re Jung, 11 N.Y.3d 365, 899 N.E.2d 925, 870 N.Y.S.2d 819; In re Bauer,
3 N.Y.3d 158, 818 N.E.2d 1113, 785 N.Y.S.2d 372; In re Esworthy, 77 N.Y.2d 280,
568 N.E.2d 1195, 567 N.Y.S.2d 390.
' McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
' See Sardino v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 58 N.Y.2d 286, 290-91, 448
N.E.2d 83, 85, 461 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231 (1983).
67 See In re Restaino, 10 N.Y.3d at 588, 890 N.E.2d at 230, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 468
("[Wihen [bail setting and recognizance release] ... are abused as punitive
instruments to deprive a person of his or her liberty-a right of the most
fundamental order-such conduct is inexcusable and does violence to the court's
integrity and inviolable public trust."); In re Duckman, 92 N.Y.2d 141, 154, 699
N.E.2d 872, 879, 677 N.Y.S.2d 248, 255 (1998) ("Nor are Judges, in the interest of
alleviating regrettable court congestion--or indeed, even in the interest of empathy
for defendants-free to ignore the law in order to weed out cases they personally feel
are unworthy of prosecution or clogging the system.").
" Cf In re Duckman, 92 N.Y.2d at 146, 699 N.E.2d at 874, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 250
(describing former-Judge's practice of "'d[oing) things in the interests of justice,
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True judicial independence comes from adhering to the rules of
procedure and substance, allowing facts and arguments to
develop, and being open to the possibility that one's perspective
on a case can be changed by persuasive advocacy and careful
study. When judges fail to adhere to this high standard and
improperly invoke legal rules simply to cover their fundamental
errors of law, they have not only failed to be accountable to the
law, they have proven themselves incapable of discharging the
"grave responsibilities" that our society accords to those whom it
entrusts to exercise discretion over decisions concerning the
public's fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property.69
When judges ignore fundamental rights, the potential for
appellate review of their errors does not mitigate the need to
impose discipline.70 Nor does the fact that other judges who have
not been disciplined may have engaged in similar improper
behavior in the past.7' The fact that prejudice to a particular
party whose fundamental rights have been violated may be
addressed at the appellate level does not undercut the need to
remove or discipline unfit incumbents who may inflict harm upon
similarly-situated litigants in the future. The focus here is on
ensuring that the public trust in the judiciary remains
uncompromised, not in correcting the harm that a deprivation of
fundamental rights has caused to one or more particular
parties.72 That is solely the function of an appellate court.
It is worth repeating that not every error in the
interpretation of procedural rights merits discipline. Discipline
is the rare case. It is to be remembered that the Commission
does not function as an appellate court, which would be the
ordinary and appropriate and almost exclusive channel of review
of judicial rulings. Thus, when a judge engages in an effort to
interpret an ambiguous statute and interprets it in a manner,
the correctness of which is "sufficiently debatable," discipline
using the guise of facial insufficiency' to dispose of a case when he 'thought it was
right to do it' ").
69 See In re Jung, 11 N.Y.3d at 375, 899 N.E.2d at 933, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
70 See In re Reeves, 63 N.Y.2d 105, 111, 469 N.E.2d 1321, 1324, 480 N.Y.S.2d
463, 466 (1984).
71 See In re Duckman, 92 N.Y.2d at 154, 699 N.E.2d at 879, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 255
(fact that other judge may have engaged in similar misconduct "would be
irrelevant").
72 See In re Jung, 11 N.Y.3d at 374, 899 N.E.2d at 932, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
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should never be imposed.73 Such was the case in In re LaBelle,
where a judge's novel interpretation of a criminal procedure law
provision allowed him to hold certain defendants without bail,
pending psychiatric evaluations. That decision was held to be
improper by the Commission, but on review our Court of Appeals
held otherwise and pointed out to the Commission that its
conclusion was not supported by either statutory or case law.
The judge's ruling was not found to be a basis for discipline
because-given the ambiguity of the relevant statutory
language-the judge's "reading of the statutes one way or the
other cannot constitute misconduct."
74
We were reminded of a judge's need to abide by binding
appellate authority recently in In re Jung, where a family court
judge continued to adhere to an anomalous policy of requiring
incarcerated litigants to specifically request from the court that
they be produced at custody hearings and request court
appointed counsel within two weeks of their initial appearance,
even if a hearing was not to occur until a later date.75 As a result
of these stringent policies, default judgments were entered,
parents lost their custodial rights and some were held in
contempt and sentenced, in absentia, to prison terms of six
months or more. After the Appellate Division granted petitions
for habeas corpus brought by litigants who were incarcerated for
failing to comply with these harsh rules, the judge failed to
meaningfully alter his policies, thereby indicating that "even the
Appellate Division precedents failed to impress the importance
of these due process rights upon [the judge] in any meaningful
way."77 Thus, it was unsurprising that a unanimous court upheld
the Commission's decision to remove this judge since
he had "steadfastly] adher[ed] to long-standing policies
that... seriously compromised the due process rights of
litigants."8
Finally, contrition plays an important role in the imposition
of an appropriate sanction, and the lack of contrition may be an
11 See In re LaBelle, 79 N.Y.2d 350, 360, 591 N.E.2d 1156, 1161, 582 N.Y.S.2d
970, 975 (1992).
11 See id at 360-61, 591 N.E.2d at 1161, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
15 See In re Jung, 11 N.Y.3d at 368-70, 899 N.E.2d at 928-29, 870 N.Y.S.2d at
822-23.
76 See id.
11 See id. at 375, 899 N.E.2d at 933, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
78 See id. at 375-76, 899 N.E.2d at 933, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
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aggravating factor. While "[in some instances contrition may be
insincere, and in others no amount of it will override inexcusable
conduct, an "utter failure to recognize and admit wrongdoing
[will] strongly [suggest] that, if [a judge] is allowed to continue on
the bench, we may expect more of the same."79 Similarly, in a
recent case where a judge improperly utilized the summary
contempt power codified in Judiciary Law section 755 to punish a
litigant whose attorney sought to place on the record the
circumstances surrounding an out-of-court encounter with the
judge, we at the Court of Appeals suggested that a judge's
recognition that such conduct was improper could potentially
"forestall the inevitable, unfortunate conclusion that, absent a
harsher sanction, more of the same will ensue."
Ultimately, judges are human beings working in a complex
legal system, under an array of broadly worded rules of conduct.
Mistakes, sometimes serious mistakes, are bound to occur. But
judges who are open to the possibility that they may have
seriously erred may also be able to demonstrate their potential
for change."1 In so doing, they manifest a commitment to judicial
accountability that provides some evidence of their potential to
exercise true judicial independence in the future.
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE REQUIRES JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
In sum, judicial independence and judicial accountability
need one another. The definition of an independent and
accountable judge is one who is faithful to the law, above all else.
Our Unified Court System along with the Commission on
Judicial Conduct have aided our state's citizens by helping to
ensure the maintenance of a judiciary willing to bear the grave
responsibility of upholding individuals' fundamental legal rights
that is part and parcel of our commitment to judicial
independence. I am proud to have been involved, both as a
Commission member and Judge, in pursuing and refining the
lofty goals of our state's Code of Judicial Conduct and hope that
this lecture has provided a helpful overview of that vital system.
11 See In re Bauer, 3 N.Y.3d 158, 165, 818 N.E.2d 1113, 1118, 785 N.Y.S.2d 372,
377 (2004).
80 See In re Hart, 7 N.Y.3d 1, 11, 849 N.E.2d 946, 952, 816 N.Y.S.2d 723, 729
(2006).
"I See In re Bauer, 3 N.Y.3d at 165, 818 N.E.2d at 1118, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
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